TAKING THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON THE ROAD: A
RATIONALE FOR BROAD PROTECTION FOR FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION ON THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY
David Gordon1

Much of the discussion and debate thus far about
the new information infrastructure has focused more
on economic issues and on the role that the government might play than on some of the inherent legal
issues that eventually must be faced. Such tunnel vision may well result in coming to grips with these
legal questions only after it is too late to establish
some basic ground rules that arguably would prove
beneficial to society.
It is imperative, therefore, to broaden the perspectives and the discussion now, before a new "status
quo" is established and some currently viable options
thereby are foreclosed. Otherwise, the emergent generation of communication channels could well wind
up regulated-and "protected"-by restrictive rules
adapted from such earlier technologies as over-theair broadcast or cable, simply because the rule-makers find it easier to apply familiar regulatory patterns instead of approaching new technological landscape innovatively.
Such specific issues as access, and, more generally,
regulation, eventually will be settled within a legal
framework. However, the lack of legal precedents
that are applicable directly to this emerging "information superhighway" provides a wide range of possible starting points and interpretations from which
to develop the legal context within which the new
information systems will operate.
The choices among these varied options are important because the basic regulatory structure is being reworked to determine the roles to be played by
cable and computer enterprises, local and long distance telephone companies, satellite communication
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firms, public interest groups, federal and state government and, perhaps, other entities such as electric
utilities. There is general agreement that current
regulations are "dangerously out of date"' as boundaries between traditional communication technologies
become ever more blurred: "[t]he established laws
governing communications apply specifically to mail,
newspaper, cable television and radio broadcasting,
in their separate legal pigeonholes. Signals in a digital environment do not differentiate among voice,
video and data."'
Certainly, some important compromises will be
made before the final structural revisions are approved. These negotiations will not be easy, as was
illustrated by the collapse of what appeared to be an
emerging consensus on the proposed revision of telecommunication legislation in the fall of 1994. Beyond the basic policy-making, and the conflicting economic and social interests behind it, broad legal
perspectives must be selected to provide the most
useful guidance for the inevitable interpretations and
applications of whatever regulatory package is finally approved.
There is a wide range of legal issues that will require answers as the new electronic information
channels come into existence. Despite a few preliminary decisions, it is not yet certain how libel or privacy laws will be affected by this electronic environment. Many First Amendment concerns such as
obscenity, indecency and copyright issues on the information superhighway still are unresolved. But a
key underlying issue, and the major focus of this discussion, concerns two dimensions of access and the
rious stages of this project.
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First Amendment protection for it: first, access for
those desiring to communicate through the new electronic networks (the "senders"); and second, and of
at least equal importance, access for people who desire a full range of opportunities to receive the various kinds of content available in these channels (the
''receivers").
A Commerce Department task force" as well as
Vice President Al Gore listed "universal services" as
one goal of the new informational infrastructure' .
Similar calls for widespread participation in
whatever the new system turns out to be have been
sounded elsewhere,' and will be supported here.
What generally has been lacking heretofore is a specific legal rationale to undergird this concept of
universality. Is the new superhighway to be treated
as, a public thoroughfare-i.e., a common carrier-or
as a private way ... or as some combination of those
extremes?
Because we cannot approach these questions with
a blank legal slate, the choice of a general philosophical approach and the precedents to back it up become crucial. The issue is whether access to the new
information channels should be based on an analogy
to public streets and parks, or on an analogy to a
company town or shopping mall, or on some variant
of these or other precedents. The answer to such
queries depends on what we want the new systems
to accomplish, or to avoid. A commitment to openness and universality seems to require choosing a legal perspective based, at least in part, on ethical concerns, and founded upon a recognition that
cyberspace is creating a new legal context where precedent must be adapted rather than applied rigidly
on the basis of what mass media have been in the
past.
Part I of this article adopts a utilitarian perspective which postulates that the greater the participation along the superhighway, the greater the eventual benefits to our "information society." This
perspective requires a flexible rather than a rigid
regulatory approach, as computer pioneer Mitchell
Kapor has noted:
Our society has made a commitment to openness and to
'
Information Infrastructure Task Force, U.S. Department
of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, The National Information Infrastructure:
Agenda for Action (1993).
' James A. Capo, Ethical Issues in the Information Infrastructure, MEDIA ETHICS, Spring 1994, at 4.
' See generally, Charles M. Firestone, ed., The Aspen Institute, Television for the 21st Century: The Next Wave (1993).
' Mitchell Kapor, Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, Sci. AM.,

[Vol. 3

free communication. But if our legal and social institutions fail to adapt to the new technology, basic access to
the global electronic media [channels] could be seen as a
privilege, granted to those who play by the strictest rules,
rather than as a right held by anyone who needs to
communicate.'

Part II of this article analogizes the electronic information highway to the traditional public forum in
order to discern standards of First Amendment protection. This section will suggest that the public forum approach will best serve the needs of a democratic society, and will do so no matter who
eventually operates the various channels of the new
national information infrastructure.
Part III of this article suggests some appropriate
legal bases for encouraging the widest possible access
to, and participation in, the technologies paving the
information superhighway, regardless of what the
basic regulatory structure becomes or how these information technologies may change in the future.
This section notes some prior approaches that arguably should be modified, because relying on them
would restrict rather than encourage "travellers" on
the information superhighway. 8
I.

A NEED FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE

In an information society, it is crucial to ensure-both legally and economically-that all members of that society have the greatest possible access
to channels of information as senders or as receivers.
Any other approach almost certainly will ensure societal conflicts between "information-rich people
[and] information-poor people" in a society where
information is power.'
The perspective here also is based on the principle
that, in almost all circumstances, the best remedy for
divisive or problematic speech lies in more rather
than less speech. This approach calls for an expansion of the "marketplace of ideas," rather than placing restrictions on speech or ideas or information because some may consider them to be dangerous or
unimportant.
In simpler mass media times and environments,
Sept., 1991, at 158.
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concerns such as these were usually perceived as the
need for access to media channels by senders or
would-be senders of informational or ideological
messages.10 In an "information age" society, exclusion from the contents of mass communication channels is just as vital, because it could produce "an informational underclass, which is less capable of
acting and choosing politically on its own behalf"
and is thereby excluded from full societal participation.1 1 Thus, the concern must be focused as much
on the potential users or receivers of the available
information as on those who have messages to send.
As this author has written in a slightly different context, what is really at stake here was expressed succinctly by Thomas Jefferson in the lesser-known final sentence of his familiar quote about the
importance of newspapers in his society:
The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and
were it left to me to decide whether we should have a
government without newspapers or newspapers without a
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the
latter. But I should mean that every man should receive
those papers and be capable of reading them."'

From a legal perspective, how might society best
implement this ideal that everyone should be capable
of receiving the material that will be available in the
various channels of the information superhighway?
On the other side of the access coin, what precedents
might be adapted to deal with legal or technological
or economic barriers to access for people who wish to
transmit material on some of those new channels? As
Kapor wrote, when focusing on one part of the
emerging information infrastructure:
As forums for debate and information exchange, computer-based bulletin boards and conferencing systems support some of the most vigorous exercise of the First
Amendment freedoms of expression and association that
this country has ever seen. Moreover, they are evolving
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rapidly into large-scale public information and communication utilities.18

But those bulletin boards and conferencing systems rely on privately-owned "access ramps" to the
information superhighway. Moreover, the computers
that generate the messages directed to those ramps
are also, more often than not, privately-owned, with
each one a "publisher" in its own right. Additionally, the government's role in directing this private/
public/quasi-public mixture of electronic traffic has
not yet been clearly defined.

II. REGULATING
THE INFORMATION
HIGHWAY AS A PUBLIC FORUM
A. Historical Overview: Applying Traditional
First Amendment Analysis to the Public Forum
The key question was posed succinctly over a decade ago by Ithiel de Sola Pool. De Sola Pool asked
whether the model for protecting or regulating the
"next" generation of electronic communication
would be the First Amendment as it has been applied to safeguard the printing press, or the First
Amendment as it has been used for public interest
regulation of the broadcast industry. 4 As a more recent observer asked: "Once words are converted from
newsprint to electrons, will they lose the special First
Amendment status they enjoy compared to their
broadcast counterparts?"'"
The issue needs to be expanded somewhat, to
serve society's members fully. It would appear that
the new electronic information infrastructure needs
First Amendment protection that recognizes it for
the "virtual public forum" it rapidly is becoming.
Expression in this new electronic environment requires protection for such open forum purposes, beyond the narrower context of traditional print or
broadcast freedoms/regulations."
INGOLD, THE VIRTUAL
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
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originated in NEUROMANCER, a science-fiction novel by William
Gibson. Rheingold at 5.
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If one wishes to provide a legal foUndation for the
widest possible use of the information superhighway,
an excellent starting place is Harry Kalven's "public
forum" concept.1 7 This approach is based on the
common law precedent that expressive access to public places-e.g., streets and parks-cannot be totally
denied even if speech in those locations may be regulated reasonably. 8 Kalven argued that the ease of
access to speak in such public forums was a good
index of the overall freedom of a given society."
If the case law supporting the use of streets, parks
and other public facilities for speech purposes is extended into the forum of electronic space, we begin
to establish a legal context that would foster more
open access to, and use of, the message lanes of the
information superhighway. However, there are some
problems related to this case law, and such an extension requires a willingness to adapt precedents from
cases arising out of the physical environment and to
apply them to situations existing in the electronic
one. In Hague v. CIO, the Supreme Court said unequivocally that streets and parks were part of the
public forum and may be used for public assembly
and discussion." Later decisions forbade the government from regulating access on the basis of content,
although content-neutral restrictions could be invoked for such purposes as maintaining order.2 The
Court, in a related series of cases, established that
public locations, in addition to streets and parks,
could be used for purposes of communication as long
as the use was not at odds with the normal operations of those locations. 2 2 In Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness,23 the Court de17
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veloped the concept of the "limited public forum"
where government regulation was more permissible."' However, the Court stated that these regulations have to be narrowly drawn, and that there
must be adequate alternative communication channels available, if a governmental entity chooses to
create and limit a public forum." Such limitations
contrast sharply with "[t]he traditional public forum
which involves -public premises where the right of
access and the
right of equality of access is
6
guaranteed.

THOMAS DIENES, FIRST

' '2

The Court also has held that some types of public
or semi-public premises are not available as either
traditional or limited public forums. These non-forums range from jailhouse grounds 27 to teachers'school mailboxes28 to utility poles. 2 Even a side-

walk between a post office building and its adjacent
parking lot was held to be less than a fully-public
forum, apparently because it was not a public passageway where the public forum concept may be applied, but instead was a sidewalk constructed solely
for the use of individuals engaged in postal business.8 0 As a result, the government reasonably could
bar the solicitation of funds from a post office sidewalk, even though it had allowed other expressive
activity there."1
Even more disturbing for free expression advocates was the 5-4 Supreme Court decision in 1992,
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 2 which held that an airport terminal may be
administered as a non-public forum because there
was no historical precedent that airports had been
made available for First Amendment activities."3 In
AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 197 (1993).

"' Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (asserting that
because a trespass statute that applied to a demonstration on the
premises of a jail was aimed at conduct of a limited kind, in an
area not open to the public, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague).
" Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.,
460 U.S. 37 (1983) (holding that with respect to property that is
not traditionally a forum for public communication, a state constitutionally may reserve the use of the property for its intended
purposes as long as the speech regulation is reasonable and is
not an effort to suppress expression).
n Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984) (stating that public property such as utility pole
crosswires that is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication may be reserved by the government for its
intended purposes if the regulation on speech is reasonable and
is not an effort to suppress expression).
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addition, the Court asserted that the government was
acting as a proprietor managing internal operations
rather than as a regulating or licensing entity and
therefore was not held to stringent First Amendment
standards. 4
B. Application of the Public Forum Concept to
Cyberspace
The concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in
Lee is an excellent starting point for the argument
that the cyberspace created by new technologies
should be addressed dynamically and creatively, with
regard to freedom of expression issues. In Lee, Justice Kennedy argued that history and subjective governmental intent regarding expressive use of public
property were less important than whether the property's actual characteristics and use allowed expressive activity to be appropriate and compatible. 8 5 To
this end, Kennedy stated that "our forum doctrine
retains no relevance in times of fast-changing technology and increasing insularity '""' Kennedy further
asserted that there were sufficient physical
similarities:
to suggest that the airport corridor should be a public forum for the same reasons that streets and sidewalks have
been treated as public forums by those who use them...
It is the very breadth and extent of the public's use of
airports that makes it imperative to protect speech rights
"

there. '

This "preference for a public forum concept
which has a capacity for growth in terms of the public facilities to which it might apply"33 allows for a
"dynamic conception" that "broadens the reach of
the First Amendment ..

"89

It has been observed

that "the essence of Justice Kennedy's public forum
analysis is a plea for recognition of the new role that
new public facilities play, and should play, in the
marketplace of ideas. '
This dynamic extension of the public forum concept is in keeping with the spirit of a much older
dissent by Justice Hugo Black, who wrote in 1949
that "[t]he basic premise of the First Amendment is
8, Id. at 2705.

85
86

Id. at 2716-18.
Id. at 2717.
IId. at 2719. Kennedy also added that "[wihen adequate

time, place and manner regulations are in place, expressive activity is quite compatible with the uses of major airports." Id.
as BARRON AND DIENES, supra note 26 at 204.
89 Id. at 205.
40

Id. at 205.

that all present instruments of communication, as
well as others that inventive genius may bring into
being, shall be free from governmental censorship or
prohibition. 1
Applying an evolving and dynamic public forum
approach to cyberspace obviously requires a mindset
like that of Justice Black, and the ability to see the
new electronic turf and "virtual realities" as more
than just digital signals. Mitchell Kapor's perspective may be helpful here, in assessing how the new
electronic networks can facilitate "[p]rivate messages
serving as 'virtual' town halls, village greens and coffeehouses, where people post their ideas in public or
'
semi-public forums." 42
If we are able to view cyberspace as more than
just digital impulses-in short, if we are able to view
electronic space as a functional if not a physical
equivalent of public spaces as we knew them before
digital communication-we then can apply an appropriately dynamic and creative approach to legal
issues inherent in the regulation of the information
superhighway. This is the approach suggested by
Patrick M. Garry, who argues that the First
Amendment must be interpreted so that it can "accommodate all the technological and economic
changes in the media" in order to protect "the democratic dialogue function" of the mass media.' 8 This,
he says, will best serve
"the needs and values of a
44
democratic society."

The concern expressed by de Sola Pool for a "policy of freedom [that] aims at pluralism of expression
rather than at dissemination of preferred ideas"'" is
also appropriate to this discussion. De Sola Pool argued that, in the electronic convergence of communication technologies, digital communication should be
developed under First Amendment protections analogous to those accorded the print media.'" This was
appropriate, he wrote, particularly in view of 18th
century technology, through which freedom of the
press "gave voice to an individual" and which
"meant that individuals could express themselves' '47-concerns

that are highly relevant to indi-

vidual communication along electronic networks.
Garry takes a similar position with regard to the
4'
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new interactive media, which he says may "provide a
participatory communication forum for social and
political dialogue, much like the role played by the
eighteenth-century American press. '"48
Placing both freedom of expression and user/receiver access to the communication system at the top
of our value system for electronic society provides a
coherent and useful framework within which to deal
with many emerging legal issues. In fact, de Sola
Pool placed the concept of freedom of expression-regardless of the medium used-at the top of
his list of ten principles for enhancing freedom of
communication in an electronic era, and at least partially implied the need for access:
The first principle is that the First Amendment applies
fully to all media. It applies to the function of communication, not just to the media that existed in the eighteenth
century. It applies to the electronic media as much as to
the print ones. Second, anyone may publish at will. The

core of the First Amendment is that government may not
prohibit anyone from publishing. There may be no licensing, no scrutiny of who may produce or sell publications
or information in any form."

As both Kapor and de Sola Pool have noted, electronic networks "contain elements of publishers,
broadcasters, bookstores and telephones, but no one
model fits." 5 If we focus on the communication
function rather than on the physical attributes of the
system, Kalven's public forum model arguably is
highly useful in developing an electronic society that
will rank higher on his index of freedom. As a society, we need to be realistic enough to see that the
electronic bulletin board systems ("BBSs") and forums developing on computer networks are, in fact,
the functional 21st century equivalent of streets,
parks and other sites where freedom of expression
traditionally has been (or should have been) encouraged; that is, we must regard electronic publishers as "the conveners of the environments within
'51
which on-line assembly takes place."

Because the courts have limited the "public forum" concept, society and its policymakers must be
sufficiently creative and flexible in order to transcend
those restrictive precedents, which simply do not conform to the new electronic information infrastructure. Otherwise, we risk serious damage to freedom
of expression, which is intended to benefit both the

49
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communicator and the public. It seems both logical
and necessary to view on-line communication channel "locations" as having a far wider-and more
crucial-societal impact than such specific physical
locations as shopping malls, which the Supreme
Court has held to be private property and, therefore,
outside of the requirements of the public forum
precedents. 2 "Virtual forums" on the electronic networks are-or will soon be-too pervasive to be regarded solely as private locations.
Borrowing from the limited public forum approach, one well might argue that, in order to be upheld as constitutional, any regulations limiting access
to information networks must be narrowly drawn,
and adequate alternative communication channels
must be made available to replace capacity lost to
regulation.5" Otherwise, potential "speakers" in electronic public forums easily could lose the protection
needed to ensure both access and equality of access.
Ensuring sufficient alternative channels will also
help to safeguard the rights of the potential audience. The ability to receive communications is as vital as the right to originate them, if people are to
have the option of seeing or hearing material ranging
from opinions and exhortations to information about
health or political matters. The best precedent in this
regard is Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, " with
its insistence that the rights of the audience are paramount. 55 This is important especially at the point
where the costs of access to the new information systems begin to exclude significant percentages of the
potential audience. If access is restricted because of
its cost, because of ideology, or because of physical or
knowledge handicaps (which raise related issues),
the democratic ideal of a participatory and informed
citizenry can never be achieved. People who are prevented from sending or receiving material unavoidably will become second-class citizens in an information society. As Wilson Dizard, Jr. has suggested,
"[tihe essential issue concerns preserving and expanding the legacy of two centuries of information
freedoms in the postindustrial environment." 56
As noted elsewhere, the "debate about the regulation of new communications technologies has too
often focused on a comparison of technologies instead
of on the underlying question of how a regulatory
regime can assure that First Amendment values-which solve the interests of both speakers and
6

See infra text accompanying notes 23-25.
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listeners-can best be served.""7 Some governmental
intervention yet may be needed in this area, to safeguard both potential originators and potential recipients of information, ideas and opinions. The Red
Lion decision, with its emphasis on audience rights,
provides the basis for this paradox of increased
cyberspace regulation in order to ensure greater freedom for a wider range of expression."
III.

FUTURE SOLUTIONS

A.

Virtual and Physical Access

Treating a minimum number of channels on the
information superhighway (perhaps the functional
equivalent of cable's "basic" services package) as
public, rather than private thoroughfares, is one way
of ensuring that various types of basic information
fully are available within the system. Of course, providing a variety of channels for public use could be
accomplished through government subsidy, but this
result also might be realized through some sort of
"public interest" requirement placed upon those private firms that are accorded a regulated monopoly or
other operating rights by the government. Perhaps
some degree of public access to channels on the information superhighway might be provided by a
manner similar to the "must-carry" rule, under
which cable television franchises are required to
carry all local channels, at least until the courts act
further on this issue. 9 Alternatively, setting aside a
fixed number of channels of electronic space for the
use of citizens might be financed by revenues from
the lease of parts of the radio spectrum. ° Lew
Friedland of the University of Wisconsin has suggested that income from such leases could create "a
public telecommunications [revenue] pool that would
build a competitive citizen's information sector separate from the corporate interests of communications
"' Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. REV.
1062, 1077 (1994). Unless this focus is altered, we will succeed
only in reinforcing the "hierarchy of protections for the media"
that currently exist. Id. at 1062.

See 395 U.S. at 390.
" See The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1465
(1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59), 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-70
(1994).
60 Will press freedom survive in cyberspace?, POYNTER REPORT, Spring 1994, at 7.
58
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giants" or of public broadcasters. 1
As to the physical details of providing access, that
part of the equation may well be much easier to
solve than the economic and legal portions. Suggestions to set up public terminals in existing institutions such as libraries or schools, or in new locations
such as information kiosks in shopping centers, already have been advanced"2 and other ideas certainly
will be forthcoming. These approaches will create a
context within which to implement the public forum
concept in cyberspace, ensuring a basic degree of access for both communicators and receivers along the
electronic information channels.
B.

Resolving Libel Issues

There is another part of this legal dilemma, beyond safeguarding both kinds of access, that also
merits brief consideration. Once on the network, to
what degree are communications protected from such
dangers as libel suits? On this topic and others such
as privacy and freedom of information, we currently
are in the initial stage of adapting technologically
outmoded precedents, and, with enacted legislation
setting only hazy boundaries, outcomes remain
murky at best." One question already being considered is what responsibility falls upon the operators of
BBSs for damaging material posted in these forums
by third parties. A second issue, yet to be determined, is to what degree materials transmitted on
the electronic superhighway are deemed to be "matters of public concern" and therefore subject to a
greater degree of First Amendment protection than
purely private matters.
The first of these concerns perhaps may be solved
by using the scienter concept articulated in Smith v.
California"' and recently revised somewhat in
Cubby v. Compuserve Inc.6 5 The scienter concept

holds that a distributor must have specific knowledge
(1991).
e3 See, e.g., BOB RITTER, NEW TECHNOLOGY AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 17 (1994) (primer on the major first

amendment issues created by new technologies and how journalism will be impacted by them).
64
361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance that made a proprietor of a bookstore criminally liable for
the mere possession in his store of a book later judicially determined to be obscene).
"s 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that a
computer service company that provided its subscribers with access to an electronic library of news publications put together by
a third party was a mere "distributor" of information and could
not be held liable for defamatory statements made in a news
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of the contents of a publication deemed to be libelous
or obscene before liability can be imposed for distribution of that publication.6" This would be a logical
starting point when considering the possible protection or liability of BBS operators.
With regard to the second issue, David L.
Marburger, a lawyer for a defendant in an Internet
libel suit, has invoked the rationale from Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,67 namely that public figures,
who presumably have greater access to the mass media than do private figures, deserve considerably less
protection against defamatory statements than their
private counterparts." Marburger has argued that
virtually all Internet publishers are public figures,
stating that, " '[u]nder the theory of the public figure, [the Internet publisher] has greater access (than
private figures) to the mass media' and, thus, needs
less libel protection, because he can rebut claims
against him . .

.

. Through global, instantaneous

communication, 'everybody has the ability to rebut
everybody.' "" This application of the principle of
meeting "problem speech" with "more speech,"
rather than with restrictions, would be highly useful
to bear in mind as the courts fashion revised libel
and privacy precedents for electronic forums.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The question of how far to protect libelous electronic speech, and the issues of sender and receiver
access to, and protection on, the new information infrastructure, ultimately will be defined by what type
of forum the superhighway is deemed to be. As that
regulatory drama begins to play out, it is worth recalling de Sola Pool's concern with the problems created by dealing with new communication technologies through the legacy of outdated regulations left
over from the most recent prior technological generation. The new media technologies of the late 20th
century, de Sola Pool wrote, require major adaptations in the regulatory approach rather than recycling the restrictive controls developed during 7the
0
first half of this century for the electronic media.
Economics and politics, of course, cannot and will
not be ignored. Clearly, there must be some accommodation made among those concerns and, on the
other hand, among the legal and ethical ideals of inpublication absent a showing that the company knew or had reason to know of the defamation).
66 Id. at 139 (citing Smith v. California at 152-53.)
67
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
68 Potter, supra note 15, at 68.
69

Id.

clusiveness, protected expression and an expanded
"marketplace of information/ideas" discussed herein.
Such an accommodation will be dictated, in part, by
what reasonably can be achieved regarding public or
other financing or subsidies, private investment in
the "public good," and related approaches to the
costs of expanded participation. But this accommodation also will be determined by the strength of the
public commitment to freedom of expression and to a
system that is accessible to those who are unable to
pay the tariffs imposed by profit-making entities.
It is important to keep the focus on the broad issue of freedom of expression for citizens in general,
rather than on media-related concerns. The latter focus is where Garry's approach creates needless definitional problems. Garry attempts to "move the free
press clause away from an interest-group orientation,""' but in doing, he worries excessively about
defining exactly what we mean by "the press," especially as it becomes less and less "journalist-centered." 2 If, instead, we remember that freedom of
expression is a right guaranteed to all citizens, not
just to the media, and if we aim to protect that right
fully on the new electronic communication channels,
the definitional dilemma disappears.
This discussion has attempted to provide philosophical and legal starting points for the decisions
that remain to be made concerning the right to freedom of expression on the new electronic communication channels, whatever form they may take. This
approach appears to be well-suited to fostering widespread participation in the "information society," regardless of the details of the electronic landscape that
finally emerge from today's uncertain picture of today. The perspectives advanced herein are vital if we
truly are concerned about preventing certain segments of society from becoming saddled with secondclass informational citizenship, and if we are dedicated to expanding First Amendment freedoms-especially freedom of expression-into electronic space.
Paul McMasters, former national president of the
Society of Professional Journalists, perhaps said it
best in 1994 when he warned against letting all media be brought to "the lowest common First Amendment denominator. "78 Rather, the highest level of
First Amendment protection is needed especially to
70
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DE SOLA POOL,

supra note 14, at 150, 189, 232-34.

GARRY, supra note 43, at 95.
Id. at 20.

" Paul McMasters, remarks at the New England Professional Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists, Boston
(May, 1994).
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protect, in the words of one recent observer, "the
1990s [electronic] equivalent of the lonely pamphlet"

Potter, supra note 15, at 68. See also de Sola Pool, supra

eer,"7 4 if all segments of society are to benefit from
the emerging communication technologies.
note 17.

